On 1 December 1805, two armies faced each other some 50 mile north of Vienna between the towns of Austerlitz and Brunn. Napoleon's French army had defeated the Austrians at Ulm in October, causing the later to retreat eastwards in order to join their Russian allies before they were caught again by Napoleon. The retreat meant surrendering the Austrian capital, Vienna to the French, something of a blow to Austrian morale5. Now the combined Austrian-Russian army turned to face the French again.
Napoleon deployed his army with almost half of his strength (35,200 men) on the left flank, which rested on the road between Brunn and Austerlitz. The right flank was thinly held by a single division of 6,000 men. Opposite them the allies were deployed in a more conventional balanced array with the center being considerably stronger than each flank. The dispositions are diagramed below: the French are in blue and the Allies in red. A division typically consisted of 5,000 to 10,000 men and a corps was made up of two or more divisions. The Roman numerals after some of the French divisions indicate the corps to which they belonged.
Russian Guard
Kollowrat's Corps Langeron's Docturov's Krenmaier's
Bagration's Division Prschibitschewski's Division Division Division Division
Suchet's division (V) St. Hilaire's Vandamme's |---------- Legrand's Division (IV) ----------|
Caffarelli's division (III) Division (IV) Division (IV)
Oudinot's division (V)
Imperial Guard Cavalry
I Corps
Napoleon justified his asymmetrical position with a thorough understanding of the local terrain and excellent intelligence gathering. During negotiations between the French and the Allies over the past several days, the latter had allowed the French delegations almost free reign to wander about the Allied camp. Napoleon had good information on the large number of new recruits in the Allied army and their relatively poor training and leadership. He also knew that the Allied army was run by committee and hampered by differences in language. Napoleon countered the Allies' numerical superiority by exploiting this information. The logical avenue of attack for the Allies would be along the Brunn-Austerlitz road, which would give them a chance to pin the French against the Schwarzawa River, hence Napoleon's weighting of his left flank along that road. By deliberately weakening his right flank, Napoleon sought to tempt the Allies to strike there with the intent of turning the French flank and rolling it up to the Brunn-Austerlitz road. Napoleon knew that the terrain on his right flank was well suited for defense and would slow any Allied attack. He also felt that the more impulsive Allied generals would see the temptation but not think through the risks. If the Allies took the bait, he would have the opportunity to inflict upon them a major defeat.
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