Relying on the advice of Hippias, the former Athenian tyrant who accompanied the expeditionary force, the Persians sailed from Eretria and landed near Marathon in part because it was one of the most convenient debarkation points for cavalry . Liddell Hart points out the brilliance of this move from a strategic point of view.
Thereby they could calculate on drawing the Athenian army towards them, thus facilitating the seizure of power in Athens by their [the Persian’s] adherents, whereas a direct attack on the city would have hampered such a rising, perhaps even have rallied its forces against them; and in any case have given them the extra difficulty of a siege.
Herodotus cites the report that the Alcmaeonidae were plotting to surrender Athens to the Persians, but does not believe it. He does allow that a signal was made to the Persians indicating Athens would submit. Rawlinson is not convinced by Herodotus’ defense of the Alcmaeonidae. Having drawn the Athenian army into the open, Liddell Hart postulates Datis then planned to fix the Athenians with a covering force, re-embark the remainder of the army and sail around to Phalerum (map 3, lower left) and thus either walk into Athens unopposed or at least meet with only token resistance.
Col 1 Col 2 Col 3 Col 4 Col 5 Col 6 Col 7 Col 8 Col 9 ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- Row 1: PRE Row 2: Row 3: Row 4: Row 5:B. H. Liddell Hart. Strategy, New York, 1967, page 27.
©2010 David Rupp