Napoleon's dispositions of the French army at Austerlitz just after sunset on 1 December 1805. The basic alignment was north-south and faced east.

The right flank was thinly held.
Stretched some three miles along Goldbach Brook were the 6,000 infantrymen of Legrand's division.
In front of them was a thin screen of cavalry tasked with keeping an eye on the movements of the combined Prussian/Russian/Austrian army who were gradually shifting south in an attempt to get around the French flank.

The center was responsible for only a quarter of the battle line. 17,000 infantrymen (the divisions commanded by St. Hilaire and Vandamme) were positioned in two lines of regiments behind Bosenitz Brook from where it emptied into Goldbach Brook to the tiny village of Girschkovitz.
Behind them were 7,400 cavalry under the command of Murat.
A squadron of cavalry was deployed as a screen in front of Girschkovitz.
The center and right flank, except for Murat's cavalry, made up Soult's IV Corps, one third of Napoleon's army.

The left flank, also a mile and a half long, straddled the Olmutz road and was anchored on the heavily fortified hill of Santon hill. It consisted of two corps and the Imperial Guard, more than half of the army.
They were deployed in depth with Lannes' V Corps in front. Lannes placed
Suchet's division in front between Santon and Girschkovitz. Behind him was
Caffarelli's division (on loan from III Corps) which was spread along the banks of Bosenitz Brook, and behind him was
Oudinot's division for a total of 19,200 men.
The Imperial Guard under Bessierres (5,500) were directly behind Oudinot and in front of
Bernadotte's I Corps of 10,500 men.

Napoleon justified his asymmetrical position with a thorough understanding of the local terrain and excellent intelligence gathering. During negotiations between the French and the Allies (Prussia, Russia, and Austria) over the past several days, the latter had allowed the French delegations almost free reign to wander about the Allied camp. Napoleon had good information on the high number of new recruits in the Allied army and their relatively poor training and leadership. He also knew that the Allied army was run by committee and hampered by differences in language. Napoleon countered the Allies' numerical superiority by exploiting this information. The logical avenue of attack for the Allies would be along the Olmutz road, which would give them a chance to pin the French against the Schwarzawa River, hence Napoleon's weighting of his left flank along that road. By deliberately weakening his right flank, Napoleon sought to tempt the Allies to strike there with the intent of turning the French flank and rolling it up to the Olmutz road. Napoleon knew that the terrain on his right flank was well suited for defense and would slow any Allied attack. He also felt that the more impulsive Allied generals would see the temptation but not think through the risks. If the Allies took the bait, he would have the opportunity to inflict upon them a major defeat.

Source: Vincent J. Esposito, A Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, 2nd edition. London: Greenhill Books, 1999.